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There are a myriad of laws, guidelines and unwritten agreements relating to human, hominid and hominin re-
mains. Legal gaps and inadequate definitions of what constitutes a fossil have meant that a ‘finders keepers’
approach is often applied to the ownership and control of our ancestors' remains. Such shortcomings expose
numerous legal and ethical conundrums. Should any one organisation, individual or government control access to
recently-found remains, limiting opportunities to unlock the secrets of evolution? Given that humans can start
fossilisation processes immediately after burial, at what point does it become appropriate to dig up their remains?
And who should control access to them? Could any prehistoric Homo ever have imagined they would one day be
exhumed and their remains laid out in cases as the centrepiece of a museum exhibit? This paper surveys a number
of implications that arise from these foundational questions, and ultimately challenges the belief that human,
hominin and hominid remains are self-evident ‘objects’ capable of clear ownership: rather they constitute creative
cultural intersections, which are deserving of greater ethical consideration. Protocols for respecting, protecting
and conserving remains while allowing a greater equity in access to information about our common ancestors are
both desirable and urgently required.1. Introduction
All humans can claim a common ancestral link to some hominin and
hominid remains: this is one of the reasons that each recent discovery of
previously unknown remains has generated tremendous levels of interest
from both the scientific community and the general public alike. How-
ever, at the moment a ‘finders-keepers’ rule is frequently applied,
whereby the person who extracts the fossilised remains from the land-
scape is allowed not only to keep them in a museum or laboratory, but
also to ration access to the information that each specimen may reveal.
Laws, principles and understandings on when the remains of a deceased
person change from being protected to becoming ‘fair game’ for fossil
collectors are at best inconsistent between jurisdictions – and at worst
non-existent.
In the past decade, new discoveries in anthropology [1, 2, 3, 4] have
completely reshaped our ancestral evolutionary tree and scientific un-
derstandings of the origin of our species. However, increased under-
standing from these discoveries is limited by the laws and/or preferencesheffers).
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evier Ltd. This is an open access agoverning access to each new find. We are therefore compelled to ask–
who owns humankind?
Hominid fossils hold invaluable information about universal human
history, yet they are most of the time treated as the assumed ‘property’ of
another entity. Depending on where the fossil is found, the custodian
may be a museum, a government agency, a public or private research
institute, or simply the archaeologist or paleo-anthropologist who
discovered the fossil. Each may have their own governance protocols and
legal frameworks, and may establish their own rules about who gets
access to the remains, and the analytical methods available to extract
information. On April 26–27, 2007, a workshop was held at the Max
Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, to answer ‘the
question of how to balance preservation of fossil hominid remains for the
future against the application of current scientific analyses’. As a result,
‘the participants produced a set of recommendations that might be useful
to museums and other institutions as well as scientists that have to make
decisions on requests for invasive sampling of hominid remains.’ How-
ever, albeit providing useful recommendations, the article fails to takene 2020
rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
Figure 1. Illustration of the ambiguity and complexity between legal, anthro-
pological definitions, and in some extent dogmatic aspects, of distinct organ-
isational units. (ka refers thousands of years and Ma millions of years). (i) Living
human (0~120 years); (ii) Recent human remains (recently deceased and direct
relative up to 6 generations, 0~250 years); (iii) Historical human remains
(historical or ancestral figures, recent - ? years); (iv) Ancient human remains
(Ethnic or cultural remains, recent ~ 50ka); (v) Prehistoric humans (ancestral
species, ~400ka); (*) complexity of the potential Boundary of “humanity” (Homo
neanderthalensis interbreeding, Homo erectus likely direct ancestor, Homo flor-
ensensis side branch not directly related, first early Homo, 40ka ~ 2.5Ma); (vi)
Hominin (excl. Homo, but includes taxon such as Australopithecus, Paranthropus,
Ardipithecus, 0.8Ma ~ 5Ma); (vii) Hominid (excl. Hominins, but includes other
great apes and their ancestral lineage, 0 ~ 18Ma); (viii) Other animals and non-
animal fossils (0 ~ 4Ga); While the first group (i) do not require any additional
definition, the second (ii) and third (iii) groups obviously overlap. The main
difference between the two groups will come from the legal definition of the
degree of separation to which remains can be claimed as direct ancestors.
Cluster (iv) includes two particular aspects of the individual, the ethnic group
(perceived by the individual or according to DNA) and the cultural ancestry.
One individual does not systematically identify himself to the culture tradi-
tionally associated with its DNA ethnic group. This introduces complex ramifi-
cations for legal status and certain rights depending on the country. To some
extent, the same complexity can be seen for cluster (v), where interbreeding
between modern Human and Homo neanderthalensis can be seen in the DNA of
individuals today. Sensu stricto, the entire Homo genus is regarded as being
Human (anthropologically but not legally), while obviously some members have
no direct ancestors with modern humans. To the contrary, some hominin species
(cluster vi) could potentially be directly related to all living humankind.
Nonetheless, for biological reason that will not be discussed here, anthropolo-
gists no longer consider human, the “hominins cluster (excl. Homo)” such as
Australopithecus or Paranthropus.
R. Joannes-Boyau et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04129into account the existing jurisdictional landscape within which such
recommendations are to be articulated. By not engaging with existing
regulatory regimes, the article presents a set of desiderata without
reference to the baseline from which those desiderata are to be estab-
lished. As a result, a number of issues arise, all of them relevant to
inscribe those recommendations within the tapestry of existing legal
provisions.
In this paper we want to begin to explore the ambiguity between the
inconclusiveness of the laws of property, the open-ended nature of what
is a ‘fossil’, and the increasingly divergent practices of anthropologists
and archaeologists who engage in the discovery of fossilised human and
human-like remains. We contend that the appropriation and manage-
ment of access to fossils has been subject to uneven, unequitable and
unethical controls for far too long. Far from being a self-evident ‘object’
capable of clear ownership, human, hominin and hominid remains are
located at contested and poorly regulated cultural and legal intersections.
2. Fossils, humankind and archaeological remains
Unresolved issues relating to the ownership of and access to remains
came to a head following the discovery ofHomo naledi [5, 6] in the Rising
Star cave near Johannesburg, South Africa. The unorthodox ways in
which the team of researchers applied excavation and scientific analyses,
with a public disclosure of the site and its fossils, before an extended
excavation was even conducted, was heavily criticised by colleagues in
the discipline. This ‘open access’ policy, not only in respect of the pub-
lication but also in respect of the fossils and data collection, was judged
by many to breach scientific ethics and protocols, arguing that ‘the dis-
covery matters less than the studies that follow’ [7]. In adopting this
open-access approach, an important question was raised that challenged
orthodoxies of practice: should the discovery of fossil remains and the
information disclosed be freely available? This proposition threatened
the modus operandi of the archaeology discipline, in particular the
assumed status of excavated human, hominin or hominid remains based
on assumptions about ‘rules’ of discovery and first possession. The
‘finders keepers’ approach was then rapidly applied and remains subject
to a range of studies controlled by those who excavated. The public
revelation of the site location and also the fact that only part of the site
had been excavated raised questions about the rights of those who may
choose to follow to excavate and control other remains which may yet be
discovered in the cave, regardless of whether they have any scientific
training or not. This case raises a number of issues, which clearly need to
be properly addressed.
Fossils are often imprecisely defined, as the term has taken on a
broader meaning in recent times. The term comes from Latin fossilis “dug
up”, but has been defined by the Oxford dictionary ((https://en.oxforddi
ctionaries.com/definition/fossil, 2017), as the remains (or impressions)
of a plant or animal embedded in rock and preserved in petrified form.
However, this narrow definition does not encapsulate the way scientists
use the word in contemporary literature. For example, eggshells or
coprolites, when found in archaeological excavation, are neither the
direct remains nor the impression of an animal, but are nonetheless
described as fossils. Similarly, bones that are in the process of fossilisa-
tion, but not yet petrified, are frequently classified as fossils by scientists
in their studies. Accordingly, in this paper we propose to broaden the
definition of fossils to any preserved evidence of a past organism's bio-
logical activity. In doing so, we are including anything that directly
survives from the organism's activity, but excluding technological ac-
tivities and artefacts such as stone tools, cave painting or fire pits.
Furthermore, since fossilisation processes can start immediately after the
death of an organism, yet may take millions of years to be fully
completed, the term ‘fossil’ can refer to remains from very different times.
Therefore, the definition cannot be accurately attached to a specific
timing, nor a preservation state.
By ignoring the limitations previously described (e.g. fossil definition,
access and implication, and human versus non-human remains), we are2
left with generally similar practices, but dissimilar laws. Importantly, this
schism between normative practices and the law illustrates a paradox
that goes to the heart of ‘owning’ humankind: archaeological practices
surrounding claims to ownership of fossils rarely follow law and legis-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R. Joannes-Boyau et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04129the ‘owner’, often the archaeologist who discovered the fossil in the first
place, and generally irrespective of (and sometimes against) the legisla-
tive framework governing the locus of discovery. Such practice induces
the ‘gentleman's club’ syndrome, whereby being part of an influential
group gives a higher chance of accessing important fossils. It also implies
a restricted approach to scientific innovations, since by restricting the
work to a similar small pool of scientists, and therefore limiting new
ideas, new technological applications and new discoveries are made
more slowly. More transparent approaches are already in place in many
countries, with attempts to standardize access procedure and impartial
decisional committees being made [12], yet these efforts are yet far from
commonplace.
In these contexts, existing laws on the status of fossils are likely to
require revision, especially if the definition of a fossil itself is to be
revised. Humans and human remains have a particular status in most of
the world's dominant legal systems, when compared to animals. But once
again, the definition of ‘human’ itself is constantly evolving and still
debated amongst scientists, making the law subject to interpretation
when it comes to archaeological human remains (Figure 1). Moreover, in
view of the recent DNA discoveries of interbreeding with Homo nean-
derthalensis [8] and Denisovans [9], or with the young but archaic species
of Homo floresensis being indirectly related to modern humans [10],
scientists are continuing to struggle in search of consensus. Scientific
beliefs in this field frequently have a direct or indirect impact in shaping
laws. Not long ago, it is worth noting, several nations even excluded
certain ethnic groups from the definition of humans [11].
In order to initiate a discussion about current codes of conduct and
research practices of fossil remains, and pointing to a new ethical
framework, it appears necessary to firstly describe, compare and under-
stand existing legal frameworks. From a legal perspective, the jurisdic-
tions discussed in this paper only engage at a very protean level with the
nuanced problems mentioned above, which serves as an invitation for
further – and deeper – comparison; further, they reflect the most classic
duality of the Western legal tradition: that is, the classic distinction be-
tween civil and common law.
Key countries were chosen as introductory examples, based on a
number of key considerations, including relevance of fossils found in the
country with regards to human evolution, ease of access to information
(e.g. language, availability of expertise), quality of the scientific research
and recent discovery, and lastly current events, incidents, or measures in
the country relating to ownership of human remains (Table 1). The ju-
risdictions selected for this paper reflect the sites of well-known discov-
eries of human and human-like remains that represent important aspect
of the ownership of humankind, but are, by no means, exhaustive or fully
representative of the full palette of legal approaches. The examples will
show that while the law purports to provide some degree of clarity, it
remains muddied by divergences between key legal traditions (Figure 1).
2.1. Common law remains in common
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Kenya provide a snapshot of the
common law's treatment of the human dead. The UK is the doctrinal
‘home’ of common law; a legal tradition exported throughout its empire.
As former colonies, Australia and Kenya exemplify how the common law
adapts to divergent ‘foreign’ contexts.
All jurisdictions share a starting premise, that there is no ‘property’ in
a human corpse. A corpse cannot own anything and ownership of a
corpse is not regulated – only the dissection or removal of tissue from a
corpse. However, license for burial and exhumation is regulated.
Frequently attributed to jurist Edward Coke in Haynes Case (1614), the
apparent simplicity of this core tenet is misleading. The common law's
central logic frays as soon as its jurisdiction moves beyond the intact
corpse. Thus, human intervention may ‘excise’ propertied human tissue
(like cryogenically stored semen) provided there is sufficient ingenuity,
alteration or modification, Lockean ‘sweat equity’. In a landmark case,
the Australian High Court propertized the unborn foetuses of 40 year-old3
R. Joannes-Boyau et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04129embalmed conjoined twins on the basis of the embalmer's care and skill
[13]. Despite its early 20th century vintage, and many unresolved ques-
tions, the case remains definitive a century and more later, suggesting an
institutional reluctance to confront the vexed boundaries of owning
humanity.
Another boundary marker, that between humans and ‘non-human’
animals, further exposes deep fault-lines in the common law. Non-
humans may be owned, unequivocally if domestic animals, and contin-
gently if wild. This then leads us to question the extent to which extinct
species cross over the imperfect human/animal divide, and how differ-
ently we would treat Homo neanderthalensis or maybe Homo naledi,
compared to species outside the genus Homo. The additional layer would
be to consider temporal implications, and explore the difference in how
common law treats the human remains from the modern era in com-
parison to ancient remains. The Manchester Museum's policy on ‘human
remains’ speaks to such problematic tensions: “Human remains include
the bodies of people who lived thousands of years ago, and of those who
have died within recent of living memory. The Museum uses the term
‘human remains’ to mean the bodies, and parts of bodies of once living
people. These are most commonly regarded as being confined to mem-
bers of the species Homo sapiens. The Museum recognises that some
communities feel a local or ancestral connection to other ancestors not
classified by scientists as Homo sapiens.” [14].
Into this jurisprudential uncertainty, legislation sometimes offers
certainty, albeit in an ad hoc way. In the UK, the Human Tissue Act 2004
regulates the removal, use and storage of human tissue for listed activ-
ities that include research and public display. It draws an arbitrary line in
the temporal sand, exempting human remains older than 100 years from
the Act's operation. However, consent obligations, or lack thereof, do not
equate to ownership. This was reinforced when a 2008 re-interpretation
of the Burial Act 1857 required reburial of ‘all human remains archeo-
logically excavated in England and Wales… after a two-year period of
scientific analysis’ [15]. Human remains persist in a ‘peculiar legal limbo
in that they cannot be technically owned’, a stasus quo that is ‘complex,
uncertain and obscure’ [16].
In Kenya, the National Museums Act and Antiquities Monuments Act
likewise draw a temporal line in the sand, deeming as arbitrary the cut-
off date for regulatory control. Under these Acts, it is illegal to remove or
trade in fossilized human remains that pre-date 1895. In cases of illegal
sales, the National Museum of Kenya is authorised to compulsorily ac-
quire remains. Importantly, the Acts vest ownership of pre-1895 human
remains in the State, with the complexities of common law property
reserved for post-1895 remains.
In Australia, unlike Kenya, key statutes leave ownership questions to
the uncertain common law. The Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act
1986 (Commonwealth of Australia), prohibits the export of ‘Class A’
cultural heritage, which includes ‘human remains’. Australia also has a
national repatriation program for Indigenous cultural patrimony that
seeks to restore ‘stolen’ human remains to affected communities. But like
the UK, state-based legislation that regulates scientific use of human
tissue (for example the Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW)), does not require
consent for human samples pre-dating 2003.
2.2. Civil law remains in codes
Civil Law jurisdictions lack the cohesiveness displayed by the above
Common Law examples, particularly due to the absence of shared pre-
cedents as a source of legal authority.
In Italy, for example, human remains cannot be object of rights, as
they are not considered goods pursuant to Article 810 of the Italian
Civil Code. Human remains are not considered a ‘thing’, but rather a
prolongation of the deceased person [17]. Similarly, in France a person
cannot be considered an object of rights, with Articles 16–19 of the
Code Civil identifying the inviolability of the human body, in its entirety
as well as in its parts, including, in this case, for commercial purposes.
However, with the donor's consent, body parts can be collected for4
medical or scientific purposes, pursuant to Article L1211-2 of the Code
de la sante’ publique. In addition, the criminal punishment, pursuant to
the Code Penal, can be imposed for interference with a cadaver located
on French soil [18]. Spain, in contrast, has articulated a highly precise
definition of what constitutes a ‘human cadaver’ and how it should be
treated [19]. China, albeit not a country usually grouped under the civil
law tradition, displays many traits typical of civil law systems, and
under Article 3 of the Supreme People's Court's Interpretation on Several
Issues on the Decision on the Civil Liabilities for the Infringement of Moral
Damages (Adopted at the 1161th Meeting of the Judicial Committee of
the Supreme People's Court on 26 February 2001, promulgated by on 8
March 2001, and effective as of 10 March 2001), the People's Court
authorises a deceased's near relatives with regard to the compensation
of moral damages caused by illegal use or damage of human remains, or
infringement of human remains in the way of violation of public
interests.
However, in each of these cases, there does not appear to exist any
special regulation governing the ownership of ‘fossilized human re-
mains’. In Italy, hominin and hominid remains are not considered
‘human remains’ per se, but rather archaeological goods, and the state
claims sole guardianship if they have archaeological or natural value.
Similarly, in China, fossils of paleovertebrates and paleoanthropoids of
scientific value are protected by the State and private individuals and
organizations are allowed to own and exchange cultural relics in certain,
highly regulated cases (Article 50).
2.3. Law and cultural rights
Both domestic and international law protects the right of access to
fossilized remains by specific cultural groups, in particular providing
Indigenous peoples with rights to repatriate remains when cultural re-
lationships are proven. Moreover, a number of issues become apparent as
a result of this very protean foray into different jurisdictional regulatory
frameworks concerning human, hominin and hominid remains. Firstly,
and more clearly in relation to human remains, questions arise in relation
to the belief systems and related regulatory practices in practice at the
time of burial. An ethical paradigm now exists, leaving many to
contemplate if such practices be simply ignored, and thus, as a conse-
quence, if contemporary practices should be conducted with the caveat
that they can be legitimately ignored by future generations. Secondly,
human remains, particularly ancient ones, represent a unique window
into our species [20] as they constitute an irreplaceable source of direct
information on our ancestors that no object can substitute. However, as
Laure Cadot suggests, ‘although the scientific value of human remains is
evident to museums, it's not possible to forget the symbolic value that
they embody for others, in particular for those communities to which
they can be connected’ [20]. Depending on the context, human remains
can be simultaneously considered, as Cadot says, human remains, sci-
entific objects with possible patrimonial value, and ‘cultural subjects’.
This legal tension is underpinned by an even deeper ontological tension:
between scientific beliefs on the one hand and diverse spiritual beliefs on
the other, with rather contrasting interests. This tension becomes
apparent in the context of repatriation of human remains to Indigenous
communities, such as in the United States and Australia. Since, according
to legal regimes, the dead have no agency, it is those with closest ties that
have a say in their remains. Finally, the boundaries of the ‘human’ are far
from being uncontroversial and uncontested. For this reason, existing
legal regimes, located in multiple jurisdictions and related to access to
human, hominid, hominin and all other remains (fossilized or not) need
to be further investigated and coordinated.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, the identification and possession of a fossil is a chal-
lenging, complex and culturally-inscribed event. The variability of defi-
nitions of the term ‘fossil’ and scientific interest in remains from multiple
R. Joannes-Boyau et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04129eras mean that it is important to define ‘fossil’ to mean any preserved
evidence of a past organism's biological activity. Given that fossilisation
processes can start immediately after death of an organism, it is necessary
to develop clear and consistent legislation to identify the point at which a
deceased individual can be exhumed and studied for scientific purposes.
In addition, analysis of legislation across multiple jurisdictions in-
dicates there are rarely special regulations governing the ownership of
‘fossilized human remains’. In some countries, such as Italy, hominin and
hominid remains are not considered human remains, but are considered
archaeological goods which are under sole guardianship of the State if
they have special value.
Finally, there is a clear tension between the potential knowledge that
science can yield through analysis of fossilised remains and the rights of
individuals and their descendants to ceremonies and burial that align
with local belief systems.
Therefore, since ownership and control of human, hominid and
hominin remains is often poorly regulated and varies greatly between
jurisdictions, decisions to make discovery locations public and to regu-
late access to recent discoveries of remains have highlighted the impor-
tance of developing common standards for ownership, protection and
access controls in relation to remains.
In the field, archaeologists frequently resort to notions of first
possession, using raw access to the fossilized resource, and the infor-
mation fossils yield, as the default normative benchmark to determine
questions of ‘owning’ humankind. Where the party granting access is
‘generous’, the need for transparency and certainty is less dire. But where
the access-giver adopts arbitrary, unpredictable practices, access out-
comes are far from desirable. Clearly, property law is uncomfortable in
dealing with the deceased human, irrespective of its vintage. This insti-
tutional discomfort implies an urgency to rethink the approach towards
information availability.
The establishment of a large workshop with key stakeholders,
including scientists, lawyers and policy makers would benefit greatly the
discipline. Only then, will it be possible to embark upon a dialogue to
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